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In spite of dedicated institutions and campaigns for their protection, animals suffer in vast 
numbers around the world. This study explores the potential for animals to be candidates 
for stronger legal protection and the barriers to actual protection becoming widespread. It 
engages with arguments for excluding animals from ethical consideration claimed for human 
beings since support for ‘equal consideration’ of animals is found in the history of 
philosophy. Drawing on rights discourse, virtue ethics, and the critique of some humanistic 
positions, including “speciesism”, the study concludes that the case for ethical concern is 
strong enough to support far greater protection against the oppression of animals. It argues 
that human denial and tyranny is at the root of animal suffering; changing mindsets is 
therefore essential for a permanent improvement in the consideration of animals. However, 
such change must be backed by legislation and powerful regulatory organisations, as has 
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The animals of the world exist for their own reasons. They were not made for 
humans any more than black people were made for whites or women for men.  
 
Alice Walker  
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Despite1long-standing acknowledgment that animals other than human beings are the kinds 
of creatures that should be afforded consideration, they are still persistently treated in many 
countries around the world with immense cruelty, both legally and illegally, and often 
beyond the purview of the public. Arguments for appropriate animal protection need 
therefore to start from their material conditions to demonstrate why human practice in 
relation to them must change. In this section I provide a few facts on the excessive use and 
ill-treatment of animals in order to desist from referring to them throughout this paper. 
 
Approximately 9.5 billion animals die annually in food production in the United 
States. This compares with some 218 million killed by hunters and trappers and 
in animal shelters, biomedical research, product testing, dissection, and fur 
farms combined. Approximately 23 million chickens and some 268,000 pigs are 
slaughtered every 24 hours in the US. That’s 266 chickens per second, 24 hours 
a day, 365 days a year (Wolfson and Sullivan 2004: 206). 
 
It is not simply the volume of animals used as our resources that is the problem, but it is also 
true that in the US “...farmed animals have no legal protection at all. As far as the law is 
concerned, they simply do not exist” (Wolfson and Sullivan 2004: 206). This allows for cost-
cutting labour practices that cause large-scale suffering to animals, against which they are 
unprotected by the law. 
 
Lori Gruen writes that: 
 
Most chickens, pigs and calves raised for food never see the light of day. These 
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animals are often so intensively confined that they are rarely able to turn 
around or spread a wing. An estimated 200 million animals are used routinely in 
laboratory experiments around the world annually. A large portion of the 
research causes the animals pain and discomfort while providing absolutely no 
benefit to human beings (Gruen 1993: 343). 
 
The tolerance society extends to factory farming and animal testing laboratories the world 
over leads one to conclude that people believe that animals should, or perhaps need to, 
suffer to serve human interests. Yet some believe that the moral standing of animals should 
afford them protection from oppression, exploitation, and pain. In practice, fulfilling human 
non-essential desires for hunting-pleasure, fur, leather goods, and superfluous scientific data 
outweighs the primary interests of animals for life and freedom from suffering. There is 
ample evidence that, running parallel to efforts to entrench stronger protections for 
animals, intolerable torture and butchering continue in closed laboratories and open seas 
around the world. Yet, our instinct for avoiding pain and staying alive is a fundamental one 
humankind shares with non-human animals (Singer 2009:11). Is it therefore morally 
acceptable for us to stifle this instinct in healthy animals because we can, or because we 
brought them into being, or because it serves us in so many ways that to stop doing so 
would seriously change the content of our lives? Is this not iniquity turned to oppression on 
far too unacceptable a scale even for the “brash, brilliant, arrogant, violent homo sapiens”? 
(Best 2009: 20). Jeff McMahan elaborates on this propensity as follows: 
 
Just as the darker side of national solidarity is a tendency to denigrate or even 
dehumanize the members of certain other national groups, so the other side of 
species partiality is a tendency to treat the interests of animals as morally 
insignificant. If we compare the number of radically cognitively impaired human 
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beings who benefit from our partiality with the number of animals who suffer 
from our tendency to regard them primarily as means to our ends, it is hard to 
believe that the effects of species partiality are desirable overall from an 
impartial point of view (McMahan 2005: 361). 
 
“Species partiality” and “speciesism” might be new terms to some, but the latter was coined 
by Richard Ryder over three decades ago (Wise 2004: 26) and is located within the spectrum 
of prejudices like racism or sexism. Some people have succeeded in overcoming certain 
prejudices while others keep them in check only because the “prejudiced”, whether slaves, 
women, or homosexuals, fought back and gained institutional protections in organised ways 
that animals are incapable of. As a result, at least some cultures have legislated improved 
conditions for “the other” when particular freedoms are fought for, bringing emancipation 
to previously oppressed groups. 
 
An earlier draft of my proposal to work on this report was entitled “Caught between a rock 
(the environment) and a hard place (humankind)” because I believe this to be the plight of 
animals in the world today. While long overdue efforts to reverse climate change, halt 
genocide, increase humanitarian aid, and bring education for all are laudable, as moral 
agents we must also bring an end to the worse cruelties we currently choose to actively 
perpetrate – not to gain anything in return, but because it would be the right thing to do. 
These worse cruelties are the physical, organised and ongoing harms perpetrated by human 
trafficking and enslavement, intensive farming practices, and laboratory experimentation on 
animals. Woman and child abuse is now considered a crime in many countries and the 
broader public is increasingly aware of international crime-fighting efforts to eliminate 
human trafficking. Similarly, more people are recognising that human life is organised 
around crimes against animals which are as deserving of punishment and penalty as are 
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crimes against humankind. 
 
This notwithstanding, animal ethics literature in general can be disheartening about the 
prospects of rising to the challenge of a revolution for animal emancipation, partly because 
philosophical writings complicate rather than simplify what can be achieved, to the 
detriment of the animal in general. The attainment of animal rights in a world that is still 
unevenly considerate of human rights may smack of wishful thinking, but it might not be as 
unachievable as it seems. David Brion Davis, writing in The Enduring Legacy of the South’s 
Civil War Victory, as quoted by Steven Wise (2004: 41), offers hope that is not without 
precedent:  
 
The obstacles to basic legal rights for any nonhuman animal... are major and 
real. Considering that slavery had been globally accepted for millennia, it is 
encouraging that people were able to make such a major shift in their moral 
view, especially when a cause like abolition conflicted with strong economic 
interests. We can still learn from history the invaluable lesson that an 
enormously powerful and profitable evil can be overcome. 
 
How might this ‘invaluable lesson’ serve animal emancipation? Well, firstly, if a moral case 
can be made to support stronger legal protection for animals, how each of us, or groups of 
us, view or value animals will affect particular considerations but shouldn’t affect the overall 
achievement of their emancipation any more than how different human views on slavery 
affected its abolition. 
 
An evolving humanity should influence moral change alongside the pragmatic and since our 
treatment of animals arguably lies amongst the worst things we do from a moral point of 
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view, it makes little moral sense to perpetuate wrongs that we actively perpetrate, while 
struggling to implement good elsewhere as in schemes to bring education for all or save 
humankind from the effects of climate change. I am not alone in this intuition that mankind 
needs to work on all of its moral failings simultaneously in order for any of its good works to 
take root and flourish. According to Steven Best, “The systemic institutional changes needed 
to avert social and ecological catastrophe must be accompanied by a parallel conceptual 
revolution that involves the construction of new values and species identities” (Best 2009: 




















The question being asked by this research report must of necessity also answer whether 
humankind has a moral obligation to accede to potential legislative measures such as the 
Universal Declaration of Animal Rights which sets out the minimum standards via which 
animals might be liberated from pain, suffering and the limiting of lifespan and purpose. 
While pain and suffering are primary concerns, their deliberate infliction is usually too 
closely tied-up with limiting lifespan for these oppressive practices to be ignored. All animals 
including the human animal have no choice but to embrace some form of pain, and 
ultimately death, since that is how life here works. But the gratuitous pain and suffering of 
particular animals that are also denied the freedom to experience a natural lifecycle is an 
undesirable and unacceptable fate for any sensitive, sentient creature. 
 
Historical lines of thinking that have shaped our treatment of animals hail from the Old 
Testament God of the Judeo-Christian tradition. In the story of creation in the Book of 
Genesis, God is said to have given man exclusive rights over nature, including animals, a 
concept that has come to be known as dominion theory (Callicott 1993: 340). 
 
“Cartesianism” is the reasoning expounded by philosopher René Descartes (1596-1650) that 
“because animals possess no rational *…+ souls, they cannot think, they cannot possess self-
consciousness and language, and, therefore, cannot experience pain” (Linzey 2009: 45). 
Together with dominion theory, Cartesianism has strongly influenced why animals occupy a 
space which those who know Descartes’ description of animals to be wrong for reasons 
described below, find unacceptable. Since Rogers and Kaplan (2004: 193) comment that 
Cartesianism is “one of the most enduring standpoints in science and popular culture”, I 
offer the following. 
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Our review of the literature on frontal cortex development enables us to 
conclude that all mammals, including rats, have a sufficiently developed 
prefrontal cortex to suffer from pain. In birds and reptiles which have some 
analogous frontal lobe structures and functions (Nottenbohm, 1977; Jerison, 
1997), suffering from pain may be more likely to be overridden with fear, but 
they appear to suffer from pain, especially chronic pain (Grandin & Deesing 
2003:1). 
 
Pain and suffering are not desirable, and McMahan (1993: 529) describes the latter thus: 
“Suffering is bad primarily because of its intrinsic nature: it is bad in itself. It may also be bad 
because it precludes activities or experiences of positive value.” Humankind therefore 
deliberately perpetrates “badness” against animals by limiting their natural tendencies and 
causing their suffering. In attempting to militate against animal suffering, we are not starting 
from scratch since at least some protective legislation has been in existence since the end of 
the 18th century (Posner 2004: 53). 
 
But since animal protection legislation to date hasn’t succeeded in its quest, this paper will 
offer reasons why animals are appropriate recipients of the same basic legal protections we 
consider necessary for humankind. Although what happens in practice may have very little 
to do with getting an argument right in theory, ethical justification for appropriate universal 
consideration of animals is surely worth pursuing. Since all animals including human beings 
experience pain and suffering in similar ways, we need to have valid moral reasons for 
treating animal suffering differently from human suffering. 
 
The literature on animal liberation is rich with examples of immoral and unreasonable 
differentiation in the treatment of animals and human beings (see Singer 2009: 17) and I 
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would now like to flag the arguments that I will NOT pursue and why. 
 
1. Arguments for animal consideration often deploy the individual characteristics of 
particular species as a starting point to demonstrate how these are similar to those 
of human beings, and hence why particular animals should be afforded moral status. 
These studies are eminently useful for educating the reader about how random 
consideration of animals is. However, an overarching argument to revitalise 
protection based on morality should stretch to include all animals and should be 
penned in more general strokes. Even if a fish feels less pain than a sheep, it has a 
fish’s interest in living a full life and killing it for food (or for no reason at all as often 
happens with nets that scour for everything on the seabed and then discard most), 
deprives it of this life. I have therefore avoided talking about specific animals and 
which practices in relation to them I seek to reduce the severity of or ban. Peter 
Singer has been referred to as neo-Cartesian because The Great Ape Project focuses 
on intelligence (Rogers and Kaplan 2004: 195). While Singer does not advocate that 
primates deserve more consideration than other animals because they possess 
greater intelligence, I can see how this conclusion can be arrived at if we accord 
animals differing treatment based on characteristics that human beings identify with 
and value, over a general position on the sacredness of all life and life free of 
interference. It also leads to a fragmentary approach to animal consideration that is 
lamentable.  
 
2. Tom Regan (2003: 70) believes that those of us who are concerned about animal 
rights and animal liberation would concur on the following: 
 The philosophy of animal rights calls for an end to the use of animals in 
cosmetic-testing in particular and product-testing in general. 
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 The philosophy of animal rights calls for an end to the coercive use of any 
animal in military research, or in such research topics as the deleterious 
effects of smoking, maternal deprivation and drug addiction. 
 The philosophy of animal rights calls for an end to the traditions of ‘sport’ 
hunting and trapping of wildlife. 
 The philosophy of animal rights calls for an end to the capture and training 
of wild animals for purposes of entertainment.  
 
I concur. However, Regan also believes that an individual’s or organisation’s position 
on ‘meat-eating,’ so-called, should be regarded as the decisive litmus test of their 
moral credibility. To the extent that individuals and organisations still support or 
tolerate meat consumption, they are part of the moral problem, not part of the 
moral solution.  
 
Regan is correct as far as philosophical argument is concerned in its quest for 
absolute answers about right and wrong. But I don’t believe this to be the applied 
ethics agenda. Applied ethics should try to bring about the best moral solution given 
the circumstances in which the dilemma exists. I believe that eating meat is wrong in 
the sense that it causes pain and loss of life. Nevertheless, I think meat consumption 
is fundamental to a number of animals, and so enjoyed and loved by the human 
animal, that the argument to convert man to vegetarianism will always draw a 
limited audience because its basis is moral and mankind’s propensity towards 
behaviour change based on moral argument is similarly limited. I believe man to be 
very much like any other omnivore in his desire for meat, but much more cruel in its 
procurement and greedy in his levels of consumption. To recognise this and want to 
work within the current moral limitations of human beings to reduce the suffering of 
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animals does not to my mind test one’s moral credibility. I will take this point up 
further in Section 3. 
 
3. I have refrained from anything but a fleeting reference to the argument from 
marginal cases (AMC) which focuses on the lack of capacity in some human beings 
which makes them less competent than some animals. The AMC argues that there is 
no sound moral basis to treat normal, healthy, intelligent animals who exhibit more 
physical and intellectual ability as less valuable than babies or children who are 
severely brain damaged. The AMC has been more than adequately expanded on in 
relevant literature (see Anderson 2004: 279; Singer 2009: 18) and, while it is 
essential to elucidating the illogic of speciesism, it is not the primary argument I wish 
to build my case upon. Capacities or the lack of them is one strand in the case 
needed to counter the widely held view that mankind does not owe other sentient 
beings the same consideration we owe human beings. People who hold this view are 
often both ‘speciesist’ and not inclined to logical analysis, so comparing brain 
damaged human children to healthy functioning animals to illustrate our misguided 
treatment of the latter, is likely to bring about an abreaction. Despite not relying on 
the AMC to the extent a paper like this might be inclined to, I nevertheless provide 
support for the very rights based case for animal emancipation that it is commonly 
used to reinforce. 
 
4. Similarly, I have generally and deliberately resisted discussing whether animals 
should acquire consideration on the basis of being declared “persons” or whether 
those who currently bear property status could remain property and still acquire 
particular basic rights. This is another one of the main debates presented in the 
literature (see Francione 2004: 125). But its resolution did not appear at first to be 
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something that would take place through extending a description commonly 
associated only with people to animals. Delving more deeply into the arguments has 
taught me that acquiring personhood is likely to be essential to winning increasing 
legal stature for animals because we depend on the law to regulate human 
behaviour. Daniel Defoe wrote: 
Nature has left this tincture in the blood,  
That all men would be tyrants if they could. 
 Steven Wise wrote: 
Humans are tyrants over things because they can be. Personhood is 
the legal bulwark that protects everybody, every personality, against 
human tyranny. Without it, one is helpless. Legally, persons count; 
things don’t. Until, and unless, a non-human animal attains legal 
personhood, she will not count (Wise 2004: 251).  
The attainment of legal personhood for animals must therefore intensify alongside 





3. Animal Suffering 
 
English jurist, philosopher, and legal and social reformer Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832) wrote 
the following, which has appeared in one form or another in a number of papers on the 
position of animals. I include it here because it is central to my argument. 
 
The day may come when the rest of the animal creation may acquire those 
rights which never could have been withholden from them but by the hand of 
tyranny. The French have already discovered that the blackness of the skin is no 
reason why a human being should be abandoned without redress to the caprice 
of a tormentor. It may one day come to be recognized that the number of the 
legs, the villosity of the skin, or the termination of the os sacrum, are reasons 
equally insufficient for abandoning a sensitive being to the same fate. What else 
is it that should trace the insuperable line? Is it the faculty of reason, or perhaps 
the faculty of discourse? But a full-grown horse or dog is beyond comparison a 
more rational, as well as a more conversable animal, than an infant of a day, or 
a week, or even a month, old. But suppose they were otherwise, what would it 
avail? The question is not, Can they reason? nor Can they talk? but, Can they 
suffer? (Quoted by Singer 1971) 
 
It is the last question that seems to me and many philosophers to be the most relevant. The 
answer is yes, and there are no longer any credible views to the contrary. More than this, 
causing animal suffering has been considered an offence serious enough to have been 
legislated against since 300 BCE (Ryder 1989: 1). If animals were considered worthy 
recipients of legal protection (against more than suffering) thousands of years ago, why is it 
necessary to pose such a redundant question in 2011? Why is it that our treatment of 
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animals remains contradictory, in that we recognise that they deserve protection and have 
instituted laws to this effect, yet continue to abuse them in a number of ways? I think we do 
so for more than one reason as outlined below, since matters that present themselves as 
serious issues can be said to be “over-determined”.1 
 
1. Substantial monetary and other benefits accrue to humankind as a result of treating 
animals as resources. 
2. Animals cannot defend themselves or mobilise themselves into unified action in 
order to challenge how we treat them. 
3. The kinds of animal suffering which would incur public outcry do not occur openly 
within the public domain. It is not hidden away either since factory farms, abattoirs 
and laboratories are sanctioned institutions, but hardly any evidence of the 
conditions of animals in these places is regularly made public. 
4. Humankind is confused (because of a variety of interpretations of dominion theory, 
amongst other reasons) about what animals owe us and in denial about what we (as 
moral custodians, for example) owe them. 
 
As consumer societies incorporating a dominant focus on money and profit, we abuse 
animals for all four reasons outlined above with emphasis on (3) – being ill-informed about 
their conditions and (4) – deep-seated confusion around the morality or immorality of what 
we do to them. The latter is partially because of the shift from pre-industrial co-dependency 
on animals, which acknowledged relationship, to industrial era mechanised exploitation 
which denies it. Historically, our survival as a species has depended on animals: hunting 
them, eating meat, wearing fur and leather to survive sub-zero temperatures, and putting 
every part of them to use. More recently we have benefited from medical research in which 
                                                 
1
 A concept argued by M Scott Peck throughout In Search of Stones: A pilgrimage of faith, reason and 
discovery, Hyperion Press, 1996. 
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animals have been experimented on to test medicines and procedures that have saved 
human lives precious to us. So, while we acknowledge that animals feel pain and suffer 
through our uses of them, we have come to accept that the suffering, of at least some 
animals, is necessary, or their lot. Believing this has allowed us to grow different levels of 
concern and systems of treatment for different animals: broadly speaking, one which covers 
the pets and working animals some societies have domesticated over time who are 
protected by law against some human mistreatment of them; others in which the animals 
we wish to consume or use as means to other ends have little or no protection against us; 
and others still which allow us to campaign vigorously for protection of those threatened 
with extinction, and those who exhibit characteristics that we identify with, such as 
intelligence and the ability to socialise and communicate, as do dolphins, elephants, 
primates and certain other animals. 
 
It may be important here to distinguish the pain and suffering of death considered 
“necessary” for human diet and the unnecessary and unacceptable pain and suffering which 
are the conditions under which too many animals live out their whole lives and then die.  
 
A paramount impediment to animal liberation is human investment in animals as food. 
Many people who eat animals would join the anti- vivisection/animal experimentation, 
poaching, and possibly even hunting lobbies. They would do so because they are against 
cruelty to animals, and are in denial or do not know that the animals they eat endure 
comparably unacceptable conditions of pain and agony to those in laboratories. In touching 
on this most fraught subject I would like to sound a cautionary issued by David Favre (2004: 
236) in his paper entitled, A new property status for animals: “It is a burden of the animal 
rights movement that so many of its leaders will support only the purest philosophical 
position, regardless of political feasibility.”  
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I think it would be difficult to convince a great deal of humanity that it is always wrong to kill 
for food. In some instances, it will be clearly morally wrong to kill if you are surrounded by a 
food already and in others it might be justified if you are hungry and have nothing else to 
eat. Homo sapiens are consumers of meat; and while we might be complex in different ways 
to animals we are also simply another omnivorous animal. We made the transition from 
hunter gatherer to intensive farmer in a relatively short period of time and, to cut a long 
story short, are now – in some parts of the world at least, referenced below – reconsidering 
whether the rearing of animals for consumption need necessarily translate into lifetimes of 
abject pain, suffering and misery which has largely been the lot of farm animals this past 
century. Countries in the European Union, for example, are revising the conditions of, and 
the laws that govern, factory farm animals (Singer 2009: x). Despite these flickers of light in 
the overwhelming darkness, the plight of too many animals we feed on remains 
unacceptable, and the reader is encouraged to read the updated version of the Peter Singer 
classic Animal Liberation (2009) to get a fuller picture. 
 
While minimalist and piecemeal change for some animals in some countries is under way, 
some people will become vegetarian or vegan, not always because they’re morally against 
meat eating, but because they are convinced by a Singer (2009: 162) argument that to 
decrease the demand for meat and dairy products while the conditions of animals remain 
untenable, is a significant weapon in the animal liberation arsenal. I think he’s right. But 
meat consumption is unlikely to come to an end in the foreseeable future, and the present 
material conditions of too many animals are too unbearable to amalgamate their struggle 
for liberation from daily pain, suffering, and drastically curtailed lifespan and purpose, with 
an ultimatum to humankind to become vegetarian. While the consumption of meat is no 
longer necessary to the survival of many people on the planet who have access to 
alternative food sources, the call to veganism is based in a hope that humankind would 
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choose to desist from a pleasure that it both loves and is convinced is necessary for its well-
being, so that animals should live. To kill to eat is a different sort of choice from killing in 
vivisection. It is primal, and to convince the vast majority of humankind to stop eating meat 
would be, to my mind, the same or as difficult as trying to get any other omnivorous animal 
to choose to be herbivore. I am, however, also convinced that the number of meat eaters 
who would prefer to eat animals that have not suffered all their lives is significant enough to 
have a dramatic and positive effect on reducing animal suffering. In other words, that 
animals and animal liberation might be greatly boosted by people who support its basic 
tenets as enunciated by Regan but who might not yet be or might never become vegetarian. 
 
Appropriate consideration of animals can only emanate from holding animals in proper 
esteem: valuing their physiology, teleology and psychology for what it actually is. References 
to ‘teleology’ in this paper are meant to raise the fact that animals too have goals and 
purposes which are frustrated or ended by human practices that intervene in and dominate 
their lives. For example, some people wish to ban animals being objectified in circuses as 
one kind of animal abuse. This study seeks to argue for active support of universal legislation 
that will ensure that no animal is neglected, starved, hurt or subjected to any form of 
deprivation or suffering including as a result of having their natural inclinations frustrated. 
 
Following this trajectory of thinking, pain-inflicting animal experimentation in all its forms, 
whether to perpetuate the evils of nuclear and germ warfare or the good of curing cancer, 
must first be outlawed. Thereafter, applications may be made to an international animal 
protection ombudsman by interested parties who wish to commit crimes against animals in 
the interests of humans or other animals. I hope this broad explanation will go some way 
towards explaining why this study advocates support for the Universal Declaration of Animal 
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Rights rather than advancing animal protection laws for specific animals or species of 
animal. 
 
Therefore my main arguments going forward are: 
(1) 
1. Both animals and humans feel pain and suffer, also when lifespan and purpose is 
deliberately curbed. 
2. All humans are declared legally protected against the deliberate infliction of such 
pain and suffering by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 
3. None of the differences between animals and humans matters from a moral point of 
view where such pain and suffering is concerned. 
4. Therefore, animals are appropriate candidates to be declared universally and legally 
protected from such pain and suffering. 
(2) 
1.   The law has proved essential to advancing struggles for human protections and  
       freedoms, employing ‘rights’ as a basis. 
2.    Animals have interests in similar protections and freedoms. 
3.    Therefore, legislation for animals as outlined in, but not limited to, the Universal  
       Declaration of Animal Rights is essential to advance animal protections and  
       freedoms.  
(3) 
1. Human tyranny accounts for much deliberately inflicted suffering, including animal 
suffering. 
2. Educational, legal and regulatory institutions that work well together to reduce   




3. Therefore educational, legal and regulatory institutions are necessary to limit human 
tyranny over animals. 
 
If current treatment of animals does not rest in the realm of tyranny, then the quest to show 
that none of the differences between animals and humans matters from a moral point of 
view where pain and suffering are concerned, must fail. Conversely, animal suffering must 
clearly be shown to be of less moral significance than human suffering. 
 
Inflicting the sort of pain and suffering on animals that it would be legally unacceptable to 
inflict on human beings, must be grounded in essential differences between animals and 
non-human animals that justify such differing treatment.  The next section will discuss the 
most commonly held reasons for justifying differing treatment  and show them to be false, 
misleading or crucially lacking in moral substance.
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4. Four Fingers on the Hand of Tyranny that Keep Animals in their Place 
 
In this section, I hope to demonstrate with substantial help from Andrew Linzey (2009) that 
a significant proportion of mankind has by and large taken the absence of particular qualities 
in animals together with certain religious claims as justification to view animals as inferior to 
human beings. Holding this position does not always bring about morally unacceptable 
situations. We have reason to believe shepherds and herders in rural villages and some 
farmers around the world care for the animals in their keep and that the relationship 
between them does not routinely result in moral conflicts until such time as an animal is 
killed to be eaten, a different moral matter from a lifetime spent in misery. 
 
The moral problem arises when traditional ways of thinking about animals are used to serve 
industrial intensive practices so that even minimal concern for the pain and suffering of 
animals gives way to the pressures of maximising profit. The consumer of meat in modern 
society does not carry any direct moral responsibility for the decisions taken on factory 
farms. As I wrote much earlier on in this programme: 
 
The post-industrial society we now live in finds people far too separated and 
unaware of what goes into, and how certain products arrive, on the shop shelves 
from which we harvest. If we could watch the processes from beginning to end, 
including all the animal experimentation involved, I don’t believe there would be as 
much of a market for the resultant products. In a similar vein, I think that if we were 
to go on an AEP class excursion to one of the laboratories that conduct such 
experiments, [...] rather than write an essay based on reading articles about it, the 
impact might elicit different arguments to ones we might currently be drawing 
(Thumbadoo 2008a: 3).  
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If we were to gaze upon animals afresh what might we make of the four traditional views 
expanded on below, that keep them oppressed? 
 
4.1 Animals are not moral agents 
 
According to Linzey (2009: 22), Samuel [von] Pufendorf (1632-1694) is an exponent of the 
view that injuring animals for human purposes is acceptable because animals lack moral 
agency. In his 1688 publication, Law of Nature and Nations, Pufendorf notes that “Roman 
jurisconsults defined the law of nature as ‘what nature taught all animals’, and not just 
human beings”. He rejected this idea of a law of nature common to animals and human 
beings because he believed our actions could be traced back to different sources: simple 
inclination, in the case of animals, and a sense of obligation in the case of man. Linzey asks 
whether possessing a sense of obligation is a morally relevant difference between humans 
and animals, and hence whether not possessing it should stand in the way of extending 
moral consideration to animals. For the purposes of this discussion, I take Pufendorf’s “sense 
of obligation” to mean an obligation to do the right thing; to exercise moral sense. 
 
Moral agency is understood to be the ability to distinguish wrong from right and to act 
appropriately on this recognition. It is commonly held that only human beings possess moral 
agency. I find this a very perplexing explanation for why animals, or animal suffering, 
matter/s less than do humans, or human suffering. On the one hand, it does not distinguish 
a capacity to drive a car with an intention to go from point A to point B, but via a circuitous 
route, the result of which should be that only humans should be allowed the opportunity to 
drive. The possession of a moral conscience, that one may or may not exercise, does not, to 
my mind, provide a reason for why the suffering of humans should be taken more seriously 
than that of animals. We cannot report that the result of having this ability called moral 
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agency is that human beings are the only beings capable of doing right things; or even that 
being able to distinguish wrong from right has had the fortuitous result of the human species 
committing many more right acts than other animals. Some humans do do what is right, 
some humans do not but, what is more, most humans dispute which actions are morally 
right, and which wrong. One might argue that if humans were exemplary moral agents, this 
would not be of relevance to the question of why animal suffering should matter less. I 
agree. But it would, in my view, form a sound basis for arguing that humankind might be 
superior on the consequentialist understanding of humans bringing about more good than 
animals. It would also be reasonable to extrapolate that if humankind did excel on the 
quality of moral agency, animals would then not be enduring the current “daily holocaust”2 
(Coetzee 2003: throughout).  Also, certain justifiable benefits accrue to agents who are 
genuinely superior. Superior activists and writers, for example, sometimes gain more 
accolades, or sell more books. Humankind presently accrues goods – such as respect for the 
possession of moral agency – to which it cannot justify entitlement since the possession of 
moral agency, on its own, does not make us superior to animals. 
 
Animals, on the other hand, who are said not to possess moral agency, go about their 
business, by and large, taking responsibility for protecting and feeding their young; avoiding 
unnecessary conflict unless it is mating season or unless their territory is under threat; 
helping each other fend off danger; and sharing food. With ever increasing human 
populations and rampant child abuse, it is reasonable to identify more strongly with the 
hippopotamus’s instinct on reproduction, which ensures that its environment can provide 
for, at most, a single offspring before procreating. Or the African wild dog’s babysitting 
regimen in which one dog, not necessarily a mother, does the care giving, while the rest are 
on a hunt. Some animals do not subscribe to all of these instincts: lion packs have been 
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observed on television wildlife shows killing even when there is no immediate need, it is 
thought to limit the competition for food. (No doubt the reason we named him king of the 
jungle: a little anthropocentric partiality.) Why they do or do not subscribe to all of these 
instincts is beyond the scope of this paper, but it is probably the subject of studies like those 
conducted to discover why man sometimes chooses to do the wrong thing. So why should a 
quality that, on dissection, shows animals to generally perform better with “simple 
inclination” than mankind does with “a sense of obligation” or a moral sense, be a legitimate 
reason for it to be acceptable for animals to suffer for humans? Or for animal suffering to 
matter less than human? Pufendorf’s explanation goes thus: “It is a safe conclusion from the 
fact that the Creator established no common right between man and brutes, that no injury is 
done brutes if they are hurt by man, since God himself made such a state to exist between 
man and brutes” (quoted by Linzey 2009: 23). Whether there is a Creator or not, animal and 
human behavioural studies of the past couple of centuries testify against Pufendorf’s belief 
in “no common right” between human and animals. Indeed, Best reminds us that: 
 
The rich science of cognitive ethology supports Darwin’s theory that humans 
differ from animals in degree, not kind, such that human forms of thinking, 
self-awareness, intentionality, communication, language, and social 
interaction are products of evolution that stem from our primate ancestors 
and are shared by numerous other species to varying degree (Best 2009: 
16). 
 
And Alasdair MacIntyre similarly reports that: 
 
...[A]lthough our differences from all other species are certainly of crucial 
importance, it is also important that both initially in our earliest childhood activities 
23 
 
and to some significant extent thereafter we comport ourselves towards the world 
in much the same way as other intelligent animals. In transcending some of their 
limitations, we never separate ourselves entirely from what we share with them 
(MacIntyre 2008: 8). 
 
This would seem to argue for there being much more in common between humans and 
animals than Pufendorf knew, or was prepared to admit. Nevertheless, this “sense of 
obligation” does throw up the possibility that humans who act kindly or well on it might 
reach a more reasoned view on the status of animals. One such view put forward by Linzey is 
this: “While animals are not moral agents, they are, nevertheless, ‘moral patients’, in that 
while they cannot choose morally, they can be harmed by the deliberate choices of moral 
agents” (Linzey 2009: 23). 
 
One might disagree with Linzey on considering findings in a Gallup study which testify to a 
chimpanzee securing bananas for the trainer it liked, but not for the one it didn’t like3 
(Hurley and Nudds: 2006). Wiliness or favouritism is perhaps not the same as exercising 
moral sense but, if it were, then some animals clearly possess it too because not rewarding 
the trainer one does not like cannot be dismissed as “simple inclination”. However one 
chooses to define the possession of moral sense, its absence in sentient subjects does not 
make deliberately keeping them in discomfort and pain for prolonged periods of time 
morally acceptable, whether they are animals or children. 
                                                 
3
 Chimpanzees who were shown videos of an actor facing a problem (leaving a room) and presented 
with cards depicting items that were relevant to the problem (bent key, broken key and regular key) 
reliably chose the right cards in multiple trials and in different scenarios. A chimpanzee chose the card 
that would secure bananas for the trainer it liked and the wrong card for the trainer it did not like, 
showing intention towards another. These studies provide evidence of rationality in animals; 
rationality which covers a sense of self, meta-cognition, memory of experience, coming to 
conclusions, making decisions based on these conclusions, therefore reflection; the possession of 
goals in social contexts as well as an understanding of agency and intention in others. The very same 
bases are covered to support human rationality (Hurley and Nudds: 2006). 
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4.2 Animals are lower in the natural order 
 
In Why Animal Suffering Matters, Linzey (2009) discusses why he believes Aristotle confuses 
natural hierarchy with moral hierarchy. Linzey quotes Aristotle from his work The Politics of 
Aristotle thus: 
 
[S]o it is naturally with the male and the female; the one is superior, the other 
inferior; the one governs, the other is governed; and the same rule must 
necessarily hold good with respect to all mankind…It is evident then that we 
may conclude of those things that are, that plants are created for the sake of 
animals, and animals for the sake of men…As nature therefore makes nothing 
either imperfect or in vain, it necessarily follows that she has made all things for 
man (Linzey 2009: 12). 
 
Whether or not one accepts Aristotle’s description of the natural hierarchy (some of which 
has since been turned on its head) or some sort of natural ordering via which human beings 
come out on top, does this necessarily imply that we can treat animals however we choose? 
Aristotle was not a power-hungry human supremacist; he was a philosopher trying to 
understand how things are and why they should be this way. He was not intent on relegating 
women, animals, and plants to a lower position, but was attributing them a place in virtue of 
what he observed in practice along with the knowledge and logic available to him. If this 
resulted in man taking up the highest position, it would follow that as a philosopher who 
existed at a time when the most illustrious aim of people was to live well or fare well, man 
would have to strive to act well in all ways. This would preclude treating animals with 
cruelty, or deliberately causing them suffering as we do today, because this behaviour would 
reflect badly on man himself. Aristotle’s natural hierarchy theory cannot therefore be relied 
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on to endorse cruelty to animals – or even to trees – by ranking them as inferior to man. 
 
4.3 Animals do not speak 
 
If one could show that possessing communication skills in the evolved manifestations that 
human beings do has had a direct impact on the reduction of suffering amongst our own 
species, then one could at least make tangential links between the possession of language, 
the lessening of suffering, and hence the moral superiority of possessing language. Language 
has been beneficial to humans in many ways; from literacy to literature to lyrics – written, 
read, spoken and sung, it has been the paramount building block for advancing human 
societies. No fit homage can be made to its value and extrinsic worth on these pages; it is 
simply an incredible advantage or good. But it is not an undiluted good. Thomas Hobbes 
writing in De Homine as quoted by Linzey (2009: 18), pointed out that, “... man, alone among 
the animals, on account of the universal signification of names, can create general rules for 
himself in the art of living just as in the other arts; and so he alone can devise errors and 
pass them on for the uses of others. Therefore man errs more widely and dangerously than 
can other animals”. 
 
This may not be a complete or valid argument in and of itself, but language is our primary 
source of power over our environment, enabling us to manipulate material reality in a way 
that no entity without language can. But it equally alienates us and can be a source of 
serious damage. From Descartes’ position on animal inability to feel pain to Hitler’s on the 
inferiority of Semitic people, man creates false notions, spreads them, and causes great 
damage. “The apparent inability of animals to deceive themselves (emphasis mine) might on 
a less prejudiced understanding of the world, place them in a higher moral category” (Linzey 
2009: 20). Hobbes described the value of language in this way: “Therefore by speech man is 
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not made better, but only given greater possibilities” (quoted by Linzey 2009: 19). One such 
possibility of direct relevance to this study is the role of language as a vehicle of consent. 
Women do not consent to rape, but it has taken a long time and much suffering to have this 
understood and accepted by some. Yet, rape occurs commonly within a community so the 
rapist and victim usually share a language. Animals do not provide linguistic feedback but 
they struggle, wrestle, whimper, and cry out in agony in almost exactly the same way a rape 
victim might do, yet these clearer non-linguistic signs have for centuries been disregarded or 
belittled because, it must be deduced, mankind is adept at denial and misrepresentation and 
is willing to administer pain. 
 
The capacity for denial is the palm in the ‘hand of tyranny’ and explains why mankind is able 
to sanction animal suffering on the scale it does. To illustrate this, I quote in full Linzey’s 
reference and comment on Noam Chomsky’s encounter with a gravestone inscription in De 
Homine. It reads: 
 
“Here lies an Indian woman, a Wampanoag, whose family and the tribe gave of 
themselves and their land that this great nation might be born and grow.” As 
Chomsky rightly comments: “she and her family didn’t give of themselves and 
their land.” Rather they were murdered by our forefathers and driven out of 
their land. However we may rewrite the history of human losers, the point is 
that animals never even have the chance of consenting (Linzey 2009: 20-21). 
 
If possession of language does not provide humankind with a superior-making feature – and 
to my mind it does not since our propensity for misrepresentation balances out gains made 
by striving for truth or goodness – then absence of a spoken language understood by human 
beings cannot make animals inferior. Even if they are misguidedly considered to be inferior 
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by some for lack of literacy, this could not diminish the gravity of their physical suffering. 
 
4.4 Human life is more valuable than animal life 
 
Theories that describe and contrast the value of human and animal life are generally vexed 
by the subjective bias of writers enamoured with the wondrous aspects of human 
characteristics or accomplishments. When I first encountered this frustration I wrote the 
following: 
 
All the literature I have read about the value of life and which lives are to be 
valued and why (and I accept that I have barely scratched the surface), speak 
mainly of the pursuits that [David S] Oderberg refers to as the value of complex 
relationships and family bonds and the advanced things that man has achieved. 
Yet, many in the developing world are by and large not living the good life so 
often written about. Nearly all of the references to why human life is more 
valuable than any others are prefaced with statements such as ‘few would 
disagree that’; ‘most people hold that; ‘we would find little disagreement with 
the view that’ and so on (Thumbadoo 2008b: 7). 
 
I disagree that all human lives are more worthy of being lived than all animal lives, and I 
compare my own dog’s chances of getting his desires met on a daily basis with those of a 
beggar I encounter regularly on a street corner – a beggar whom I suspect often does not 
fare as well as my dog did. Having desires met is one strand in the value of life debate, and 
this comparison is not meant to do any more work than flag the fact that millions, if not 
billions, of human lives do not contain the elements of value which many philosophers who 
write on this subject have foremost in their minds when they argue that the lives of animals 
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are always less valuable than the lives of humans.  Both human and animal lives can have 
intrinsic value and a number of common factors can detract from this value for both. 
 
Tom Regan’s accounting of value is much more promising for the cause of animals because it 
includes them equally. “According to him, all beings who have inherent value *i.e. subjects of 
a life] have it equally. Inherent value cannot be gained by acting virtuously or lost by acting 
evilly” (Gruen 1993: 346). Even if we would like to believe that we value all people equally in 
principle, in practice those who are considered more evil are less valued, while those who 
are more virtuous are more valued. So society imprisons and sentences to death many who 
commit crimes and lauds and rewards those who pull off miracles for the good like Nobel 
Peace Prize winners. Regan’s “inherent value” and my notion of incremental value in virtue 
of escalating goodness or decreasing value in virtue of increasing badness represent two 
entirely different kinds of valuing. If I support mine, it seems that I cannot support Regan 
because his is absolute and mine relative. While I am not certain that they have to be 
mutually exclusive, I agree with Regan that all living beings have inherent value and should 
start off on an equal footing. My hesitation in making absolute pronouncements on ‘value’ 
might underscore the unsatisfactory nature of particular ways of establishing value and 
therefore of ‘value’ as an instrument for establishing candidacy for moral concern. Kai 
Horsthemke (2010: 246) echoes this concern: “...the notion of inherent value is not very 
useful in philosophical discussion. If it remains unsubstantiated, it is vague and obscure.”Yet 
even with substantiation which brings clarification in the way Immanuel Kant does, the 
matter remains unsatisfactorily resolved, at least for me. “But suppose there were 
something whose existence in itself had absolute value. […+There is such a thing! It is a 
human being!”4 (Bennett translating Kant 1997: 28). He stakes this claim because only 
human beings exercise rationality and as I have written elsewhere, “Kant would have us 
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believe that Josef Fritzl [for example], the Austrian who pleaded guilty in March [2009] to 
imprisoning his daughter in a dungeon for 24 years, and fathering seven children with her, is 
of absolute value. To me it would seem as though something has gone very, very wrong if 
we must believe this” (Thumbadoo 2009: 3). 
 
Conversely, then, would some humans – the morally exemplary ones like, say, Archbishop 
Emeritus Desmond Tutu – be of greater value than animals? I would be inclined to say yes, 
but in the same way that certain animals who have adopted and taken care of animals not 
related to them would be of greater value than other animals and many human beings. Does 
valuing good in this way tell us anything about the supposedly greater significance of good 
people’s pain and suffering? Is their pain more important than the pain of animals or less 
“valuable” humans? No. Because any alleged human/animal difference in value is irrelevant 
to any supposed difference in the significance of their pain. 
 
Flaws in the reasoning that all human beings are always more valuable than any or all 
animals weaken humankind’s case for radically different treatment from animals. Bridging 
the exaggerated distance set up between humans and animals therefore strengthens the 
argument for animals to assume the same basic protections which humans receive. No 
further justification should be required because everything else on this planet is not like us. 
Mountains, rivers, “valuable” things, beautiful things, surely all deserve some kind of 
protection, but not for the same reasons sentient beings would share. If lower animals or 
certain organisms cannot suffer, then this argument will not address them. But if an animal 
feels – and so very many do – then it becomes a moral imperative not to cause them 





Since drawing this conclusion seems rather elementary, I would like to conclude this section 
with one possible explanation for why humankind chose (instead) to exaggerate the 
differences between it and animals. 
 
As a strong reaction to theism, the hegemony of theology, and the oppressive 
and hostile stance the Christian Church took toward scientific and technological 
advance, humanism sought the unleashing of the powers of science and 
industry, it sought to replace the domination of nature over humans by the 
domination of humans over nature, and urged humans to seize command over 
the natural world and use it to improve human life. This Promethean outlook 
tended to further separate culture and nature, and despite an expanding 
scientific optic it further polarized the “animal” and “human” worlds, such that 
animals were unthinking beasts contrasted to the luminescence of human 
reason. The rationality, technology, culture, and other core attributes of 
humans were defined not as elaborations of the animal world but as arising ex 
nihilo as singular phenomena utterly and radically new in history (Best 2009: 4).  
 
Whether or not the reader accepts this explanation of how we arrived at present day 
human/animal relations, it nevertheless sheds light on a number of questions related to our 
present circumstances. For example, humankind is reminded almost daily that forces of 
nature are capable of displacing and annihilating us and, that while this might have occurred 
at other points in history, this is the first time we are grappling with the likelihood that the 
survival of future generations is dependent on an opposite approach to the one described by 
Best: the coming together of the best attributes that ‘rationality, technology, culture’ and 
morality offer while discarding that which perpetuates the polarisation of humankind from 
everything else. If it were scientific evidence that went beyond the intuition of Bentham we 
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required, we now know much more about the many ways in which animals are like us than 
we did even a few decades ago. We also know much more about how and where we come 
from as a species and that we are much less significant than we once believed. In beginning 
to admit to the devastating effects of our attempts to dominate nature, we are finally seeing 
where excessive uses of natural resources and industrial-intensive action have led. 
 
The MEA [Millennium Ecosystem Assessment] concludes that human activities 
have taken the planet to the edge of massive ecosystem destruction and have 
weakened nature’s ability for the purification of air and water and climate 
regulation, resulting in drastic changes in the Earth’s climate and environment, 
further threatening humanity’s own well-being (King 2009: 22).  
 
Parallel to putting in place a variety of urgent measures to avert catastrophe, while some 
still believe this is possible, the status and treatment of animals is also the subject of 
increasing debate and activism. Several factors complicate a reversal of attitude towards the 
non-human animal, not least amongst them the fact that animal activists differ about how 
best to characterise animal interests, and their diverse views impact on unified action in 
defence of animals. These views range from being against cruelty to animals, to being 
concerned about animal welfare, to believing animals matter because they are sentient or 
“subjects of a life” (Regan 1985), with an increasing number of animal activists at the more 
militant end of the spectrum: for example, by blocking ships carrying slaughtered cargo from 
leaving harbours as a breakaway group of Greenpeace, Sea Shepherd, does. Against this 







5. Interests, Rights, Laws, and Virtues 
 
5.1 Equal Interests  
 
Bentham has suggested a formula, analysed here by Singer that might support a moral 
imperative to offer animals the same basic protections as humans, without resorting to a 
judgement of characteristics or value:  
 
“Each to count for one and none for more than one.” In other words, the 
interests of every being that has interests are to be taken into account and 
treated equally with the like interests of any other being. Other moral 
philosophers, before and after Bentham, have made the same point in different 
ways. Our concern for others must not depend on whether they possess certain 
characteristics, though just what that concern involves may, of course, vary 
according to such characteristics (Singer 1971).  
 
According to Gruen (1993: 350), “Regan and Singer argue that giving greater weight to the 
interests of members of one’s own species is indefensible. They suggest that animals and 
humans share the same morally relevant characteristics which provide each with equal 
claims.” Some philosophers – when faced with a moral dilemma that their instincts rally 
against resolving on the equal interests principle – resort to last ditch scenarios to illustrate 
how human interests should always trump animals’ interests. What would one do if a house 
was burning and one had to choose between saving a child and saving a dog? Last ditch 
scenarios are dangerously unhelpful at resolving serious moral dilemmas that would have 
broad impact. In real life they hardly ever arise, and who is saved is not as morally significant 
as the fact that someone risked his own well-being to save another being who (a) valued 
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his/her life; (b) would have suffered but for the act of bravery; and (c) might have been 
mourned in death. 
 
I have noted that people often respond to the equal interests’ principle with jibes about 
animals not requiring voting rights and freedom of expression. While rights accorded animals 
will need to fit sensible purposes, it is not difficult, once you put your mind to it, to imagine 
groups of people voting on behalf of animals for political dispensations that animals would 
prefer (see 5.4.2). Embracing the equal interests’ principle is essential to understanding how 
animals might acquire similar rights to people within a legal system that is accustomed to 
treating them as property; with any rights they accrue vesting in their owners. 
 
5.2 Human rights and animal rights 
 
The past century saw women, people of colour, children, and homosexuals acquire 
legal rights previously denied to them because it was agreed, amongst other things, 
that they were being prejudiced in some way, and that their interests in being 
protected should triumph. Since people do not necessarily relinquish their prejudices 
as a result, and many continue to act on them, this proclivity is the impetus behind the 
legalisation of protection. The law prohibits certain actions but also enforces penalties 
if the laws are transgressed because it anticipates the actions of those who do not 
ascribe to it. So, we have laws against woman and child abuse, racist or heterosexist 
acts, and concomitant punishments. Such laws are not always promulgated on the 
impetus of broad-based recognition of the prejudice. If a moral case can be made for 
why certain freedoms (such as homosexuality with regard to the South African 
constitution – a gain which was made as a result of a timely and strategic intervention 
rather than majority consensus) should be protected, or particular practices banned, 
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legalising the protection and the ban can follow. By so doing the law displays its 
particular capacity amongst societal institutions to act as both a procurer and enforcer 
of moral positions. The law has been playing this role, as far as the protection of 
animals goes, since at least as early as the third century BCE (Ryder 1989: 1). 
 
“No living beings are to be slaughtered or offered in sacrifice” (The Fourteen 
Rock Edicts, 1) professes Asoka, as emperor of India who “became a Buddhist 
and a vegetarian and, in accordance with the doctrine of ‘ahimsa’ 
(nonviolence), suppressed the royal hunts and ordered the curtailment of the 
slaughter of animals throughout his empire” (Ryder 1989: 1).  
 
Since we do not live in times when a benevolent, visionary dictator can simply impose the 
moral high ground (a controversial but increasingly attractive notion), we need to look 
elsewhere to do so if we agree that animals have interests in much more comprehensive 
protection than they currently receive the world over. National constitutions or Bills of 
Rights are the places one might look to and, since 1994, the South African constitution is said 
to be an exemplary model of human protection. In order for constitutional applications to 
legitimately exclude animals, they must arise out of concepts which naturally exclude 
animals or have relevance for humankind only.  
 
Dignity is seen by the legal community to be the grundnorm or a founding principle of the 
South African constitution. Roman law contains the concept dignitas which is roughly 
interpreted nowadays by lawyers to mean the right to self-respect to which every individual 
is equally entitled because they are said to possess equal moral value. Any fact about 
individual human identity, such as hair colour or IQ, is irrelevant to the moral status of that 
person since it is an inherent quality or a birthright. Where do we draw the line on the 
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possession of dignity? In the legal sense mere biological life does not bring direct moral 
value which is why people in persistent vegetative states can have their lives ended – 
because experience is seen to be the first threshold for being morally considerable5 
(McConnachie 2010: presentation). Animals have the same capacity to experience and, like 
human beings, they display interest in having more positive than negative experiences. The 
possession of dignity by animals (the root reason why a number of legislative instruments 
for greater protection of animals have been instituted in several countries in recent years) 
(Singer, 2009: xiii), taken together with equal interests considerations, entitles animals to 
the same protections the South African constitution seeks to accord previously 
disadvantaged groups of people. Such protections for animals would go beyond pain and 
suffering to embrace lifespan and purpose too.  
 
Where there is a conflict of interests between animals and people, Kirsten Youens (2001: 2) 
suggests that these be resolved by the law taking the lead to enforce change by “granting 
animals” legal standing. Moral and legal standing are not the same thing, but as Kai 
Horsthemke (2010: 274) notes “… it may well be the case that common moral goals, such as 
freedom from exploitation and abuse, would be more readily attained if rights, especially 
legal rights, were extended to all powerless individuals, in other words, to animals as well”. 
 
South Africa is home to both human rights activists and animal activists, with some of the 
latter being champions of animal rights. The struggle against apartheid and the experience 
of living in a fledgling democracy for the past 17 years has taught South Africans that while 
promulgating laws is not a panacea for gaining meaningful protections for people, it can be a 
powerful starting point. Rape, for example, is a punishable crime in South Africa, but a 
                                                 
5
 A position argued by Chris McConnachie at the Hunterstoun Symposium, ‘Non human animals – 
where do we go from here?’, 29-30 May 2010, University of Fort Hare. 
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woman is still raped every 17 seconds6 (Rape statistics South Africa and Worldwide 2010: 1) 
because laws are not entities that necessarily effect change in behaviour. Nevertheless, 
having the law in place presents an opportunity for activists to rally to make the right more 
meaningful. The men and possibly women who are responsible for women remaining at risk 
are the perpetrators of the rape, as are the police and prosecutors who do not treat it as a 
serious crime, and the judges who have frustrated activist groups such as People Opposing 
Women Abuse (POWA) by handing down minor sentences and insignificant bail charges to 
rapists, thereby setting a precedent that rape is not a serious offence. This overall societal 
attitude to rape makes it much harder to exact justice for rape victims and survivors.  
 
Similarly, those who have taken up the struggle for animal emancipation have come to 
realise that activism without laws is unlikely to bring about urgent and appropriate redress 
for animals and that, as with human struggles, the law must play a greater role.  
 
There can be no doubt that change is in the air in relation to the legal status of 
animals. The philosophical debate is growing, and there is increased acceptance 
of the idea that the law must recognize that animals have intellectual, 
emotional, and physical attributes that entitle them to certain basic rights 
beyond protection from egregious cruelty (Wolfson and Sullivan 2004: 205).  
 
5.3 Laws, ambiguity, and attrition 
 
Laws that protect farm animals for example against certain kinds of cruelty have been in 
place for a few centuries in many countries, but these laws do not provide adequate 
protection, and ways have been devised to legally circumvent them.  






In a rapidly growing trend, as farming practices have become more and more 
industrialised and possibly less and less acceptable to the average person, the 
farm-animal industry has persuaded the majority of state legislatures to actually 
amend their criminal anticruelty statutes to simply exempt all “accepted”, 
“common”, “customary”, or “normal” farming practices (ibid: 212).  
 
The cause of this regression in moral and legal practice is due to the pressure of profit 
imperatives, and the reason it continues is the fact that, by and large, consumers do not 
know that the standards of confinement applicable to the animals they eat are criminal and 
excessively cruel. Both reasons point to the moral problem lying with people, and not with 
factors that support animals being less worthy of consideration. Some societies eat dogs and 
cats, and other societies protect them. Societies that protect dogs and cats do everything in 
their power to circumvent anti-cruelty legislation that regulates how they treat cows, sheep, 
and pigs.  
 
Since in practice people cannot be trusted to uphold the law and yet, without it, the case for 
entitlements to rights cannot take off, this study has struggled to pin down one ethical basis 
from which the overall case for institutionalising protections for animals can be grounded 
without the threat or indeed the guarantee of erosion. We have witnessed this happen time 
and time again when protections stand on one of these ethical pillars, whether the equal 
interests formula, or moral consideration, or even legal rights entitlements. While a 
philosophical argument to ground animal consideration on ethical bases need not address 
erosion of animal law in practice, as an applied ethics paper it would be remiss to make a 




The oppressive conditions of animals are not that different from those of women and 
children in some parts of the world, which is to say that a variety of protections need to be 
entrenched, not that the response needed to animals is less critical. Recognising that the 
cause of animal emancipation is rightly placed within a set of interrelated struggles for 
dignity and freedom further strengthens the case for animals to acquire the same basic 
rights as humans. Horsthemke (2010: 244) suggests that, “An evolutionary analysis of the 
recognition of rights might focus [...] on the consideration that evolution has undermined 
our belief that human beings are ‘special’*...+ and thereby pave the way for the recognition 
of the moral rights also of others who are not human.” 
 
Horsthemke’s analysis of rights in The Moral Status and Rights of Animals shows how rights 
are the sort of entities that in and of themselves draw animals under the banner of their 
protection: “I do not pretend to be able to prove that animals have rights. What I think can 
be shown, however, is that if there are any rights, that is to say, if rights ‘exist’, in the sense 
of being attributable to humans, then they cannot plausibly be withheld from animals” (ibid: 
247). This breakdown underscores the outcome of my analysis in section 4 (that the 
differences between humans and animals are not morally relevant to their suffering) and 
supports a strong resistance I have had throughout this paper to illustrate why hurting 
animals is the kind of thing that warrants legal redress in the way murder might, but 
adultery does not. Indeed, I think there may well be particular cases when murder should 
not warrant legal redress and adultery could. Since this sort of distinction might be obscure, 
let me try to make clearer here what I mean. Horsthemke (2010) is not claiming to be able to 
prove that animals have rights. As much as I can see the value of and have argued for the 
notion of rights, I am not claiming that human beings ‘have’ rights because they are 
enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Rights are only as real as the 
efficiency and sensitivity of the justice system in a given country. But if they can be made to 
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exist and operate on behalf of human beings, then they can be made to exist and operate on 
behalf of animals at least as far as suffering goes since we have shown that the differences 
between humans and animals are not morally relevant to their suffering.  
 
Further, human beings have the right not to be murdered as can be assumed from Article 3 
of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights: Everyone has the right to life, liberty and 
security of person (http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/index.shtml).  
 
This does not detract from the fact that there are many who would not view as a crime, the 
assassination of, for example, a handful of world leaders who are viewed as oppressive 
tyrants despite their right to life.  
 
Similarly, take the example of a man who has been hurt by infidelity in a first marriage and 
vowed never to marry again. If he adhered to this vow for 20 years only to finally give in to 
the endless remonstrations of his decade-long girlfriend who promised never to be 
unfaithful and who subsequently was, then some might agree that her act warrants legal 
sanction while the assassins of the tyrants do not. 
 
By so saying, I am acceding that rights and their upholding and what constitutes illegal action 
is a murky area. Therefore, instead of elaborating on specific laws which might for example 
allow domestic animals the right to life and therefore never to be euthanised, but might also 
bring counter claims to the validity of said law in light of the actions of a vicious pit-bull who 
has hurt other animals, I have chosen to argue for universal entitlements for animals based 
on the declared universal entitlements of human beings. 
 
In an ideal world, one in which doing the right thing (whatever that may be) flourished, 
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“natural rights” would suffice. All creatures would abide by some perfect code in which no 
bad was done to another. The existence of man is at the root of what makes this impossible. 
Yes, nature is cruel, and some animals are cruel to others, but perpetual subjugation to cruel 
and painful conditions is man’s forte. The discourse of moral rights came into being to 
establish particular protections which themselves had to be upheld as “legal rights”. Rights 
discourse attempts to enshrine certain notions as sacred and worthy of protection. Amongst 
these notions is dignity, the freedom to express the purposes for which one is born, and 
freedom from pain and suffering, because we have established that violating these is wrong. 
If it is wrong for the goose then it is wrong for the gander. Wrong is not wrong that becomes 
less wrong when the subject being violated is not human. So the moral rights that 
Horsthemke (2010) speaks of as being equally applicable to animals and humans can be 
transposed into legal rights for animals, if they do for humans. This supports a perennial 
claim that causing pain to animals requires legal redress simply because they are sufficiently 
similar kinds of entities to humans and not because we have to scour them for a quality that 
would make them worthy. If humans are deemed appropriate candidates to acquire basic 
protections there can be no moral reason for animals not to be.  
 
According to Horsthemke (2010), Thomas Young and John Lawrence revived Bentham’s 
notion of the possibility of animal rights because they argued that, “’Life, intelligence, and 
sentience necessarily imply rights’, a verdict they took to apply to humans and non-humans 
alike” (ibid: 248). Some people believe that animals are moral subjects deserving of rights 
and many others have written tomes to justify why they are not candidates for the same 
kind of moral consideration humankind deserves. Thomas Berry’s description of the earth 
community’s “right” to exist as quoted by Cormac Cullinan in Wild Law is both simple and 




Referring to rights in their original (as opposed to legal) sense, Berry equates 
the having of rights with existence – ‘rights originate where existence 
originates’ and that every member of the Earth Community has the right to be, 
the right to inhabit and the right to fulfil its role in the ever-renewing processes 
of the Earth Community (Youens 2001: 8).  
 
According to Berry, then, just being should earn one rights. I agree that having evolved over 
millennia should earn one protection as part of a bio-community, but I am not sure that 
existence on its own earns rights. “The idea of rights seems to draw its strength from the 
existence of adverse conditions [...] moral rights almost always precede institutional rights 
[emphasis mine]. Once instituted, rights function as [...] protective measures in order to 
prevent previously dominant predicaments from once again becoming the norm” 
(Horsthemke 2010: 317). Such “adverse conditions” are now the daily lot of many more 
times the number of animals than it was for people seven decades ago. 
 
Just as the framers of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights acted both in 
the long established philosophical traditions of the Enlightenment and in 
response to the horrific events of the first part of the twentieth century, so the 
framers of the Declaration on Animal Rights were motivated both by the 
humanist philosophical tradition and by the unprecedented nature and extent 
of animal exploitation at the end of the 20th Century7 (uncaged.org 2010: 3). 
 
Animals who, at the very least, exhibit “life, intelligence, and sentience” and experience 
adverse conditions deserve to be drawn under the banner of basic rights in the 
“extensionist” way described by the designers of the Declaration of Animal Rights. 
                                                 
7
http://www.uncaged.co.uk/declarat.htm “Human and Animal Rights: One Struggle – One Fight”, p.3 
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We believe that the future belongs neither to the entrenchment nor the 
consolidation of the ideals of 1948 [when the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights was ratified] but to their extension. Specifically, we believe that the time 
has come to recognise the moral imperative to include non-human animals 
within the sphere of protection that the Declaration establishes. The human 
race has long recognised that animals are not merely the instruments of our 
desires or will, and that the reality of their capacity to experience pleasure and 
pain, happiness and suffering, compels us to recognise that moral limits must 
apply to our treatment of non-human as surely as to human8 (uncaged.org 
2010: 1). 
 
5.4 Extending appropriate legal instruments 
 
To take off from Horsthemke’s (2010: 371) point that “moral rights almost always precede 
institutional rights”, one purpose that would be served by according animals rights would be 
the benefit that would accrue to them via institutional protection, including the law. “Under 
traditional conceptions of law, animals were typically regarded as objects of rights vested in 
their human owners but not as the holders of rights against human beings. Even as objects, 
animals historically occupied a large place in the overall system of legal rights and social 
relations” (Epstein 2004: 144). 
 
In order for animal protection laws to play a relevant role today, we need to reconsider the 
material conditions of animals as outlined in the Context (which barely scratches the surface 
of what animals currently endure). The following are two specific types of legal argument 
and one legal principle that are particularly suited to extending human law to animals, rather 
                                                 
8
http://www.uncaged.co.uk/declarat.htm “Human and Animal Rights: One Struggle – One Fight, 
website title page. 
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than treating animal law as legitimately separate. As such, they describe the kind of 
normative legal position most helpful to entrenching protections for animals in the ways this 
study advances. 
 
5.4.1 The case from arbitrary discrimination  
 
According to David Bilchitz, “One of the important elements of moral legitimacy is a 
commitment to a basic principle of non-arbitrariness: similarly situated individuals must not 
be treated differently unless there is a justifiable reason to do so” (Bilchitz 2009: 4). Left to 
their own devices, even under trying environmental conditions, animals tend to show a will 
to live, a desire to grow families; some live communally sharing hunting and security tasks 
and in general they show themselves to have and to pursue interests. It is much the same 
with humankind. James Rachels, in Created From Animals as quoted by McMahan, put it 
thus: ‘‘if we think it is wrong to treat a human in a certain way, because the human has 
certain characteristics, and a particular non-human animal also has those characteristics, 
then consistency requires that we also object to treating the non-human in that way” 
(McMahan 2005: 354). If there were an animal that felt no pain, could not be made to suffer, 
and had no wish to express desires – this would be an appropriate animal to exclude from 
this protection. Giving teeth to this legal imperative on behalf of animals will require an 
overhaul of all laws that govern animals. It is for this sort of radical global shift in thinking 
that this paper aims at making the case. 
 
5.4.2 The cases from assent/consent 
 
“Both ethically and legally, the notion of informed consent has become indispensable in 
assessing the acceptability of a given act” (Linzey 2009: 21). How might “informed consent” 
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be made to work in the interests of animals who cannot be “informed” of the kinds of things 
they may be subject to, nor refuse consent? Moral concern for animals entrenches the 
notion of their consent and consent in their best interests. “The inability of animals to 
consent cannot imply a diminished moral obligation on our part. On the contrary, our 
responsibility increases as we recognise that the relevant factor is absent” (ibid: 22). 
Whether individual countries execute this responsibility by including animals in their Bills of 
Rights or award protections under separate and new legislation, appropriate consideration 
necessitates re-examining whether animals currently regulated would be likely to consent to 
the treatment they endure.  
 
Bilchitz (2009: 4) raises another possibility of redress for animals in writing about 
hypothetical consent: “... a Constitution is legitimate if its terms would have been agreed to 
by the groups in question (who do not have the capacity to assent to its terms) should they 
have had the capacity to agree.” The notion of “hypothetical consent” might as easily be 
deployed in the interests of animals (as human) by allowing a mix of legitimate animal rights 
organisations to “stand in” for animals to determine whether they would be likely to consent 
to being subjected to certain acts.  
 
5.4.3 The principle of non-regression 
 
“There is a principle of international law which human rights advocates hold dear. It is the 
principle of non-regression. This principle of state practice requires that the norms already 
adopted should not be undone at a later date – in other words, we should not go backwards 
in the standards of protection of the individual.”9 A strand of frustration running through 
this paper has been noting how effectively laws traditionally depended on to protect animals 





are rendered ineffectual. For as long as humankind exists, reproduces, encroaches and 
requires a never-ending supply of resources, animals and the rest of the natural world will 
be at risk. Laws and legally established institutions alone will never be sufficient to 
permanently safeguard animals because it is in man’s nature to subjugate anything that 
serves an interest or purpose. The writing of this principle into the animal legislation of all 
countries might provide some resistance to anticipated attrition in animal rights law. 
 
5.5 Virtuous agents on animal emancipation 
 
“Perhaps one man ‘cannot help’ but believe that he can enslave others of another race, 
gender, religion, nationality, or species, while another ‘cannot help’ but believe that he 
can’t” (Wise 2004: 25). If this is true, and it does appear to be, then the ultimate challenge 
for animal emancipation is twofold. One lies in the strengthening of appropriate universal 
legislation for which this paper has so far argued. The other lies in getting people to act well 
or against their lower nature while accepting that an innate quality is one that sometimes 
cannot be put right. Actively working against our propensity to hurt and subjugate will 
require education systems that teach ethics and nurture the virtues by also entrenching 
particularly progressive positions on animals from philosophers of various traditions. I refer 
here to perspectives that leap-frog our thinking and shift paradigms about what is both good 
and right in the way Martha C. Nussbaum agrees some philosophers have been able to. 
“Both Bentham and Mill in their time and Peter Singer in our own have courageously taken 
the lead in freeing ethical thought from the shackles of a narrow species-centred conception 
of worth and entitlement” (Nussbaum 2004: 302). Bentham, Singer, Regan, and Best are not 
virtue ethicists but their arguments for animal consideration provide new starting points to 




“Animals prey on, eat, and kill one another, but, with the rare exception perhaps of 
chimpanzees – not coincidentally our closest biological relatives – they are not pathologically 
obsessed with control, power, domination, violence, killing, warfare, status, and wealth” 
(Best 2009: 19). Stilling these human tendencies, which is our only hope of voluntarily 
dismantling all oppressive systems in the long run, must surely also involve ongoing 
education. Including education that starts with the individual and moves outwards; that 
starts with the best understanding of ourselves we can muster. We cannot hope for things to 
change for the good out in the world if we have not worked hard at properly understanding 
what is good ourselves, and how we ourselves are bad.  
 
The realisation of animals’ rights and ‘animal emancipation’ can be seen to 
imply ‘human liberation’, the act of humans freeing themselves from the role of 
subjugators, from the dominant relationship they have with the rest of animate 
nature, and from dependence on animals at the expense of the latter’s lives, 
freedom, and well being (Horsthemke 2010: dust jacket).  
 
Many people might not agree with this statement, but this paper argues that it is the correct 
intuition. If it is a virtuous disposition that provides impetus to distinguish correct intuitions 
from incorrect ones (and I am not certain that it is, since not falling victim to denial seems 
equally necessary to this quest) then education in the virtues, including testing for its 
assimilation in the individual and its expression in conduct, would be an obligatory step to 




6.   Notes before concluding 
 
The reader might question how animal experimentation might be altogether circumvented 
when this work has been vital to developing medicines that have healed and helped human 
beings and animals for centuries. Before conceding to its benefits, we should first 
acknowledge that experimentation, vivisection and similar practices are morally wrong and 
cast them as crimes of a particular sort. This might follow on the heels of animals acquiring 
personhood or basic rights or rights based on equal consideration but it might equally occur 
as a separate process. Once this is done, we need to publicly table the many ways in which 
animal experimentation is more wrong in current times than it was when first embarked on 
(which the Johns Hopkins Centre for Alternatives to Animal Testing and FRAME (Fund for the 
Replacement of Animals in Medical Testing) amongst others, acknowledge).10 They do so 
because humankind is now in possession of a store of scientific data from which it may 
extrapolate information, as well as synthetic alternatives to animals. Over and above this, 
volunteer human beings, whether in or outside of prison, provide more appropriate 
candidates for procedures and drugs intended for human usage. With human populations 
and unemployment at excessive levels, a fair fee should ensure there would be no need to 
look beyond human beings who provide the additional benefit of being able to consent. I 
would hope that a concomitant sense of human responsibilities would stem any human 
rights violations claims this suggestion might attract. 
 
 “Speciesism” as a term and as a label acknowledging prejudice might never muster the level 
of disapproval that some of the other “isms” do. If this proves true, it will not do the work 
that being accused of racism or sexism does, firstly because no animal is going to accuse one 
of being so and, secondly, because many people might not mind being so. I see this 





weakness in the term as strengthening the case to ground virtues, as far as right action in 







The greatest impediment to animal liberation is not that people do not believe that animals 
suffer. It is instead that they do not believe animals matter as much as human beings. In 
consequence, animal suffering counts only to the extent that an individual or community or 
society values animals. I wrote in Section 3 that humankind has come to believe that animal 
suffering is necessary, but I have found no sound reasons to support this in my investigation. 
Instead I have discovered that animal suffering more than just matters, and that it matters, 
for the most part, in the same way that human suffering does. Whether to increase pleasure 
and decrease pain from a preference utilitarian perspective; to refrain from committing 
unacceptable harms from a deontological position; or because a virtuous agent would not 
willingly and intentionally cause preventable harm, if human beings are entitled to 
protection from physical harm then animals should be entitled to the same basic protections 
for the same reasons. Those who do not accept this conclusion, I believe, do so from a 
propensity for tyranny noted all those years ago by Bentham. It would be difficult to 
convince them otherwise because their reasons for believing as they do are not rooted in 
“universalisable” morality or logic, but in their opposites. Those who do not share this 
resistance, identify with a higher moral intuition coming down in philosophical writings 
which dictates that much more must done to bring animals under the same banner of moral 
concern as human beings.  
 
My study of what constitutes appropriate consideration of animals has both frustrated and 
appeased me. In the beginning I felt that an evolving humanity should have been much 
further along the road to treating animals with the respect and dignity many feel they 
deserve. It took me a while to understand that this depended, perhaps too heavily, on an 
50 
 
intuition or personal position regarding animals, and that the concepts of respect and dignity 
towards humans are unnecessarily complicated within an applied ethics discourse. 
 
Considering the evidence, it is difficult not to agree that the treatment of animals around the 
world constitutes a ‘daily holocaust’. I had originally taken for granted that the existence of 
Societies for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals and Humane Societies around the world 
indicated that animals were receiving progressively evolving consideration. That – as with 
many human struggles for freedoms or better living conditions – the cause of animals was 
likely to be advancing in similar ways. The most cursory investigation revealed that I had 
been naïve and that, in fact, some animals, in greater numbers than ever before, are being 
subjected to unprecedented cruelty. 
 
Why did I think certain practices were so wrong when they were so widely accepted? 
“Because animals feel pain”, was my first reaction, but this was followed by a second, 
deeper acknowledgement that many animals were not that different from me. I was quite 
sure that most ordinary people accepted that animals feel pain, so what was bothering me 
so deeply about this situation that did not seem to bother most people and, indeed, had not 
bothered me for much of my life? One answer is that I had not known the extent of the 
suffering involved in intensive-industrial farming practices, and the other is that I had not 
realised the vast number of animals used in painful scientific and nuclear experiments. These 
are just two of a number of ways we abuse animals. Admitting to being ill-informed was the 
first step. Uncovering methods that have been devised to get around animal anti-cruelty 
legislation, and learning that a number of research experiments are considered superfluous, 
came next. It seemed to me, then, that the underlying fault lay within the character of 
humankind, and not with inadequate data on which animals feel pain, and to what degree 
this pain is experienced. For this reason, I have refrained from being sidetracked by the 
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volume of research that examines animal intelligence, ability, and feeling. The extent to 
which animals possess these characteristics seems to me to be irrelevant: that so many do 
should be sufficient to warrant them more consideration than we might muster for a brick. 
 
With this realisation came the discovery that there is a difference between people who find 
it relatively easy to accept that animals are simply our resources, with pain and drastically 
curtailed freedoms being part of this lot, and those whose intuitions rally against this – even 
if people within both sets hold a range of views on what they believe to be acceptable 
treatment. If human beliefs and shortcomings are at the nub of what is wrong with how we 
treat animals today, it seemed to me that I needed to examine what had shaped these. 
Linzey’s (2009) sketch of our relationship with the animal world, from the Aristotelian 
natural order theory to the Judeo-Christian tradition, helped to expand this knowledge and 
brought Darwin’s theory of evolution into consideration, but it did not answer my question 
about humanity’s propensity for cruelty. We have been trying to still this tendency and grow 
our potential to be kind, perhaps since the beginnings of religious and ethical consciousness. 
Some of us, with the benefit of good parents, are taught to be kind when we are little 
children, and this involves not doing bad things like hurting our siblings, friends, or the family 
pet. Some children respond well to this sort of teaching because, I would like to believe, it 
speaks to something inside of them that wants to be kind. Others do not. Accepting that 
behaving decently cannot be left to individual whim, we have instituted laws to regulate 
human conduct. Following this line of thinking, has confirmed that only the law is uniquely 
placed to enforce notions of appropriate treatment of animals as it has done for the 
appropriate treatment of humankind. The broader education system, advocacy 
organisations, and consumer forums are also powerful allies in bringing about changed 




In exploring the moral imperative to institutionalise animal protection, I have not come up 
with any fresh or distinctive answers, since the answers have always been with us. However, 
I am now convinced that there should be a stronger drive to get individual countries to sign 
the Universal Declaration of Animal Rights to provide animal legislators and activists a broad 
and well conceived minimal basis from which to strengthen animal protection. While this is 
underway we need to better ourselves in order for anyone or anything around us to receive 
a fair deal. We need to nurture the virtues in ourselves or we will not know how to apply 
them in relationship to any ‘others’. Parallel to doing this, though, we will need legal and 
other institutions to help us regulate our basic tendencies. 
 
This report concludes, therefore, that humankind has a moral obligation to free animals 
from pain, suffering, and human practices that drastically limit their lifespan and purpose 
because the differences between human beings and animals are not morally significant in 
this regard. Arguments from actual practice with regard to securing human protections and 
freedoms indicate that we need to establish permanent legal institutions to realise this 
obligation. Individual countries therefore need to become signatories to the Universal 
Declaration of Animal Rights as outlined here:  
"Inasmuch as there is ample evidence that many animal species are capable of feeling, we 
condemn totally the infliction of suffering upon our fellow creatures and the curtailment of 
their behavioural and other needs save where this is necessary for their own individual 
benefit.  
"We do not accept that a difference in species alone (any more than a difference in race) can 
justify wanton exploitation or oppression in the name of science or sport, or for use as food, 




"We believe in the evolutionary and moral kinship of all animals and declare our belief that 
all sentient creatures have rights to life, liberty and natural enjoyment. 
"We therefore call for the protection of these rights."  
http://www.uncaged.co.uk/signudar.php 





UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF ANIMAL RIGHTS 
Preamble 
Considering  
that Life is one, all living 
beings having a common 
origin and having diversified 
in the course of the 
evolution of the species; 
Considering 
that all living beings possess 
natural rights, and that any 
animal with a nervous 
system has specific rights; 
Considering  
that the contempt for, and 
even the simple ignorance 
of these natural rights cause 
serious damage to nature 
and lead man to commit 
crimes against animals; 
Considering 
that the coexistence of 
species implies a 
recognition by the human 
species of the right of other 
animal species to live; 
Considering  
that the respect of humans 
for animals is inseparable 
from the respect of man for 
another man. 
IT IS HEREBY PROCLAIMED: 
Article 1 
All animals are born equal 
and they have the same 
rights to existence. 
Article 2 
a) Every animal has the 
Article 3 
a) No animal should be 
submitted to bad treatment 
or cruel actions. 
b) If the death of an animal 
is necessary, this should be 
sudden and without fear or 
pain. 
Article 4 
a) All animals belonging to a 
wild species have the right 
to live free in their natural 
environment, and have the 
right to reproduce. 
b) Each deprivation of 
freedom, even for 
educational purposes, is in 
opposition to this right. 
Article 5 
a) Every animal that usually 
lives in a domestic 
environment must live and 
grow to a rhythm natural to 
his species. 
b) Any change to this rhythm 
and conditions dictated by 
man for mercantile purpose, 
is a contradiction of this law. 
Article 6 
a) All animals selected by 
man as companions must 
have a life corresponding to 
their natural longevity. 
b) To abandon an animal is a 
cruel and degrading action. 
Article 7 
Working animals must only 
work for a limited period 
and must not be worked to 
exhaustion. They must have 
Article 9 
In the eventuality of an 
animal bred for food, it 
must be fed, managed, 
transported and killed 
without it being in fear or 
pain. 
Article 10 
a) No animal should be used 
for entertainment. 
b) Animal exhibitions and 
shows that use animals are 
incompatible with an 
animal’s dignity. 
Article 11 
Every action that causes the 
unnecessary death of an 
animal is cruel, which is a 
crime against life. 
Article 12 
a) Every action that causes 
the death of a lot of wild 
animals is genocide, that is a 
crime against the species.  
b) Pollution and destruction 
leads to the extinction of 
the species. 
Article 13 
a) Dead animals must be 
treated with respect. 
b) Violent scenes, where 
animals are the victims, 
must be forbidden at the 
cinema and on TV, unless 
they are for the 
demonstration of animal 
rights. 
Article 14 




right to be respected. 
b) Man, like the animal 
species, cannot assume the 
right to exterminate other 
animals or to exploit them, 
thereby violating this right. 
He should use his 
conscience for the service 
of the animals. 
c) Every animal has the right 
to consideration, good 
treatment and the 
protection of man. 
adequate food and rest.  
Article 8 
a) Experiments on animals 
that cause physical and 
mental pain, are 
incompatible with animal 
rights, even if it is for 
medical, scientific, 
commercial or any other 
kind of experiment. 
b) A substitute technique 
must be investigated and 
developed. 
must be represented at 
government level.  
b) Animal rights must be 
defended by law as are 
human rights. 
The text of the UNIVERSAL 
DECLARATION OF ANIMAL 
RIGHTS has been adopted 
from the International 
League of Animal Rights and 
Affiliated National Leagues 
in the course of an 
International Meeting on 
Animal Rights which took 
place in London from 21st to 
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